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Construction Law
by Henry L. Balkcom V
Dana R. Grantham**
and Devin H. Gordon*.
This Article surveys construction law decisions handed down by
Georgia courts and construction-related legislation enacted by the
Georgia General Assembly between June 1, 2005 and May 31, 2006. As
in prior years, the cases discussed are divided into five categories: (1)
contracts, (2) torts, (3) mechanics and materialmen's liens, (4) arbitration, and (5) miscellaneous. Recent legislation is highlighted and
summarized in Section VI, including a brief overview of the General
Assembly's substantial revisions to Georgia's "Right to Repair" Act, the
mandatory alternative dispute resolution framework that the legislature
put in place in 2004 for residential construction defect claims in Georgia.
I.
A.

CONTRACTS

Quantum Meruit and the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted an
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity whereby a general
contractor was allowed to recover damages from a county school district
and other defendants on the theory of quantum meruit, despite a
* Associate in the firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP (Construction Law and
Litigation Section), Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Institute of Technology (B. Civ. Eng., 1994);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., 2000); Member, Mercer Moot
Court Board (1998-2000). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP (Construction Law and
Litigation Section), Atlanta, Georgia. Hollins University (B.A., with honors); The University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001). Executive Articles Editor, Georgia
Law Review (1999-2001). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP (Construction Law and
Litigation Section), Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.Mus., 2001); Vanderbilt
University Law School (J.D., 2004). Notes Editor, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment
Law and Practice (2003-2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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Georgia statute requiring that all contracts with county governing
authorities be in writing and entered in the county's minutes.
In Brown v. Penland Construction Co.,' Penland Construction
Company, Inc. ("PCC") sued the Walker County School District, the
Walker County Board of Education (the "Board"), Ridgeland High
School's booster club, and Michael Brown, the high school's former
baseball coach, seeking payment for PCC's construction of an indoor
baseball practice facility to be used for baseball training and summer
camps. Although construction of the facility was approved by the Board
and built at Brown's request, no written contract was ever executed by
the parties. Upon completion, PCC attempted to recover its expenses
from the Board, but the Board refused to pay for the building or to allow
PCC to disassemble the prefabricated structure and remove it from the
Board's property. PCC then brought this action for quantum meruit
against the defendants.2
The case was tried before a jury in the Walker County Superior Court,
which found that no oral contract existed between the general contractor
and any of the defendants. Nonetheless, the jury determined that the
general contractor was entitled to recover $150,000 on the theory of
quantum meruit. The defendants appealed the jury verdict, asserting,
inter alia, that (1) recovery in quantum meruit is prohibited by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, (2) Brown, the former coach, did not
receive any personal benefit from the construction of the building, and
(3) the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence.3 Based
upon principles of constitutional law, the court of appeals rejected the
appellants' enumerations and affirmed the jury's judgment against all
appellants.4
As a general rule, the court stated that recovery in quantum meruit
is equivalent to recovery based upon an implied contract, which is
statutorily prohibited under Georgia law when a county or its subdivision is a defendant.5 According to Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A.") section 36-10-1, "'all contracts entered into by the county
governing authority with other persons in behalf of the county shall be
in writing and entered on its minutes."' 6 Thus, for a contract with a
county or county subdivision to be valid and enforceable, it must comply

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

276 Ga. App. 522, 623 S.E.2d 717 (2005).
Id. at 522-24, 623 S.E.2d at 717-19.
Id. at 523-24, 623 S.E.2d at 718-19.
Id., 623 S.E.2d at 719.
Id. at 524, 623 S.E.2d at 719.

6. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1 (2006)).
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with the statutory requirements.' Nevertheless, the court stated that
the shield of sovereign immunity does not bar recovery of just and
adequate compensation from a county where property is taken for a
public purpose.'
This principle, however, applies only where the
complainant has a valid property interest in the property that is taken.9
Here, the court determined there was no question that the general
contractor had a valid property interest in the building because he had
paid for all of the materials and labor to erect it.' ° The school officials
admitted that the facility was a benefit to the school and that the school
district had utilized the building for public purposes (as a classroom and
athletic facility)." In addition, the court held that the former baseball
coach had benefited economically from use of the facility to recruit and
train high school athletes and by receiving monetary compensation for
operating baseball camps in the new building. 2 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the school district's refusal to pay for a facility it used for
public purposes constituted a taking under the Georgia Constitution. 3
As a result, PCC was entitled to just compensation and relief from the
appellants for their use of the facility.'4 Based on this "constitutional"
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court affirmed the
jury verdict in favor of the general contractor.15
B.

ContractualRight to Set-off

In Foster & Co. General Contractors v. House HVAC/Mechanical,
Inc. ,16 the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that Foster & Company
General Contractors, Inc. ("Foster") was entitled under its subcontract
with House HVAC/Mechanical, Inc. ("House") to withhold final payment
from House pending satisfaction of the subcontractor's payment
obligations to its suppliers, despite having received a lien waiver form
from House promising that it had either already paid or would use the
monies from the final payment to pay all of its outstanding obligations
related to its work on the project.' 7

7. Id.
8. Id. at 524-25, 623 S.E.2d at 720.
9. Id. at 525, 623 S.E.2d at 720.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 526, 623 S.E.2d at 721.
13. Id. at 525, 623 S.E.2d at 720; see GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1(a).
14. Brown, 276 Ga. App. at 525, 623 S.E.2d at 720.
15. Id. at 527, 623 S.E.2d at 721.
16. 277 Ga. App. 595, 627 S.E.2d 188 (2006).
17. Id. at 600, 627 S.E.2d at 192.
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Foster and House entered into a subcontract for the provision and
installation of a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system for the
Clayton County Board of Education Building Complex (the "Project")
being constructed by Foster."8
As a condition precedent to final
payment, the subcontract required House to provide satisfactory
evidence to Foster that "'all known indebtedness connected with
[House's] Work [had] been satisfied.""' 9 The subcontract also provided
that the general contractor had an "absolute right" to set-off from monies
due or owing to the subcontractor for
"all claims, debts, costs, expenses, damages, liabilities or other obligations which [Foster] has incurred or might incur as a result of any acts,
omissions, breaches, or negligence by [House] arising out of or related
to any and all agreements, contracts, subcontracts,. . . by and between
[Foster] and [House], ...

the Project, . . . or any other matters or

dealings of any kind between [Foster] and [House]."

°

After a dispute arose between the parties regarding nonpayment of
House's sub-subcontractors and suppliers, Foster asserted its right under
the subcontract to withhold final payment from House until House had
paid all bills associated with its work on the Project.
When Foster received final payment from the owner, House requested
immediate release of the remainder of its retainage, even though House
continued to have unpaid suppliers and had not yet completed all items
on the punch list. When Foster refused, the subcontractor made a claim
on the general contractor's payment bond for final payment of retainage.
After the surety denied the claim, House then filed an action for breach
of contract and 21failure to honor the payment bond against both Foster
and the surety.

In the trial court House moved for summary judgment on the basis
that it had satisfactorily completed all of the work called for under its
22
subcontract and was, therefore, entitled to final payment in full.

House also contended that the "Unconditional Waiver and Release Upon
Final Payment" that it executed showed that the parties contemplated
that all unpaid suppliers would be paid out of Foster's final payment to
House, and thus Foster breached its contract when it withheld funds
from House pending satisfaction of all of House's obligations to its

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

595, 627 S.E.2d at
595-96, 627 S.E.2d
596, 627 S.E.2d at
596-97, 627 S.E.2d
596, 627 S.E.2d at

189.
at 189 (brackets in original).
189 (brackets and omissions in original).
at 190.
190.
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subcontractors and suppliers." The trial court granted House's motion
for summary judgment, and Foster appealed.24
On appeal Foster contended that the subcontract provided that Foster
could withhold final payment from House until House had paid "'all
known indebtedness connected with [House's] Work,'" and House openly
acknowledged it owed suppliers outstanding debts related to the Project
at the time Foster requested final payment.25 Foster also contended
that the parties' subcontract afforded Foster an "'absolute right"' to setoff against monies owed all claims or other obligations Foster might
incur as a result of acts, omissions, or breaches by House.26 Finally,
Foster asserted that the subcontract authorized Foster, in the event of
a default by House, to deduct the cost of making good any deficiencies
from payments due to House.27 The court of appeals agreed with
Foster's contentions.28
The court observed that under O.C.G.A. section 13-11-3,29 a subcontractor is entitled to payment for performance in accordance with its
contract only upon satisfaction of the subcontract's conditions precedent
Here, the subcontract granted Foster the right to
to payment.3 0
withhold final payment from House until House had paid all known
indebtedness related to House's work. 1 Construing the contract as a
whole, the court concluded that the parties intended for the general
contractor to remain entitled to withhold final payment pending the
subcontractor's satisfaction of all known obligations related to work
performed on the project.3 2 Instead of eliminating the general contractor's right to withhold final payment as a set-off to outstanding
indebtedness of the subcontractor, the court determined that the final
lien release and waiver merely reinforced the subcontractor's obligation
to pay its suppliers from monies received from final payment by the
general contractor.33
The court also rejected House's contention that allowing the general
contractor to withhold final payment exposed the subcontractor to

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 598, 627 S.E.2d at 191.
Id. at 597, 627 S.E.2d at 190.
Id. at 598, 627 S.E.2d at 191 (brackets in original).
Id. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 191-92.
Id., 627 S.E.2d at 192.
Id. at 600, 627 S.E.2d at 192.
O.C.G.A. § 13-11-3 (Supp. 2006).
Foster, 277 Ga. App. at 598, 627 S.E.2d at 191-92.
Id., 627 S.E.2d at 191.
Id. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 191.
Id. at 598-99, 627 S.E.2d at 191.
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"double liability."34 House contended that it should not be required to
forfeit part of its final payment on account of the fact that its subsubcontractor had failed to pay for materials provided by a supplier."0
The court disagreed, noting that the language of the subcontract
required House to pay for "'all materials, equipment and labor used in,
or in connection with, the performance of [the] Subcontract through the
period covered by the previous payments received from [Foster]."' 36
Moreover, as between Foster and House, the subcontract allocated the
risk of nonpayment of suppliers to House, not Foster.37 Thus, the court
concluded that it was House, not Foster, who breached the parties'
subcontract when House failed to make sure its subcontractors and
suppliers were fully paid.3
II.

TORTS

A.

Negligent Entrustment
In Webb v. Day,39 the Georgia Court of Appeals declined to hold a
construction company liable for personal injuries caused by a third party
who borrowed the construction company's forklift after-hours.4" The
plaintiff, Webb, was employed by one defendant, Pike Creek Turf Farms
("Pike"), who had contracted with another defendant, W. Day Construction, Inc. ("Day"), for the construction of a house on Pike's property. Day
rented a forklift from a rental company and told the rental company that
Day intended to use the forklift for its construction work and that Pike
intended to use it to trim tree limbs. On the day of Webb's injuries, Day
lifted a Pike employee in the forklift to trim tree limbs. After Day left
the job site at the end of the work day, the Pike employee decided to use
the forklift to continue trimming. When the Pike employee lifted Webb
into the air to trim the limbs with a chainsaw, Webb fell and was
injured.4
In response to Day's motion for summary judgment, Webb argued that
there were material issues of fact regarding whether Day had negligently entrusted the forklift to the Pike employee." The court stated that

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 192.
Id.
Id., 627 S.E.2d at 191-92 (brackets in original).
Id., 627 S.E.2d at 192.
Id. at 599-600, 627 S.E.2d at 192.
273 Ga. App. 491, 615 S.E.2d 570 (2005).
Id. at 493, 615 S.E.2d at 572.
Id. at 491-92, 615 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id. at 493, 615 S.E.2d at 572.
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"'[u]nder the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he
entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that
the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent
by reason of age or inexperience.' 4 The court of appeals disagreed,
holding that there was no negligent entrustment where the Pike
employee was entitled to use the forklift and where Day had no control
over the use of the forklift because Day had already left the job site.44
B.

Negligent Failureto Enforce Alcohol Policy

In the case of Dale v.Keith Built Homes,45 the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant contractor, holding that the contractor's alleged failure to
enforce a no-drinking-on-the-job policy did not increase the risk that a
sub-subcontractor's employee would consume alcohol during his lunch
hour and, while driving after work, strike a child who was skateboarding.4' The general contractor for a construction project subcontracted
the drywall work to a subcontractor, who in turn sub-subcontracted the
work to McCain. McCain employed Wadsworth for the project. During
his lunch break, Wadsworth, unbeknownst to McCain, drank six of
McCain's beers. After work, the two returned to McCain's home, and
sometime later Wadsworth drove to a convenience store. While driving
back to McCain's, Wadsworth struck and injured the plaintiff who was
riding a skateboard.47
The plaintiff asserted that the contractor "voluntarily undertook to
detect and prevent the consumption of alcohol by workers on its jobsites"
and that the contractor's failure to do so was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. 4' The court of appeals noted that in order for a
plaintiff to recover from a defendant who voluntarily, or even gratuitously, performs an act, the plaintiff "must show either detrimental reliance
or an increased risk of harm."4 9 The court of appeals refused, however,
to extend liability to the contractor in this case, noting that "'failing to
take all possible actions to prevent an occurrence is not the same as
increasing to the risk of the occurrence.'" 5 °

43. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co., 207 Ga. App. 853, 859,429 S.E.2d 530,
535-36 (1993)).
44. Id.
45. 275 Ga. App. 218, 620 S.E.2d 455 (2005).
46. Id. at 219-20, 620 S.E.2d at 456-57.
47. Id. at 218-19, 620 S.E.2d at 456.
48. Id. at 219, 620 S.E.2d at 456.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 220, 620 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga. App.
1, 3, 470 S.E.2d 474, 477 (1996)).
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Acceptance Doctrine and Negligent Design of a Public Road

The court of appeals considered several issues related to public road
construction in the case of Ogles v. E.A. Mann & Co.,51 one of which is
discussed below. The plaintiff was injured in a single car accident on a
county road in Jones County, Georgia and sued the Department of
Transportation ("DOT"), Jones County, and several contractors, including
E.A. Mann & Co.-a paving contractor-on various theories, including
that the work was not properly designed, inspected, or maintained.52
The court of appeals agreed that summary judgment for E.A. Mann was
proper because its work had been accepted by the owner of the road and
its paving work did not fall into the "inherently dangerous" exception to
the acceptance doctrine.53 The court observed:
The "acceptance doctrine" provides that when "the work of an independent contractor is completed, turned over to, and accepted by the
owner, the contractor is not liable to third persons for damages or
injuries subsequently suffered by reason of the condition of the work,
even though he was negligent in carrying out the contract, at least, if
the defect is not hidden but readily observable upon reasonable inspection."s"
The court recited numerous facts showing that E.A. Mann's work had
been accepted prior to the plaintiff's accident.55 However, the court also
noted that the acceptance doctrine does not apply where the contractor's
work is "'inherently or intrinsically dangerous'" or "'so negligently
defective as to be imminently dangerous to third persons. ' 5 6 The court
did not agree with the plaintiff's argument that factual issues remained
regarding whether paving was an inherently dangerous activity because
paving has never been included in the list of what Georgia courts
typically recognize as inherently dangerous activities, and the undisputed evidence showed that any potholes that had existed prior to
acceptance had been repaired.5" The plaintiff's expert's statements,

51. 277 Ga. App. 22, 625 S.E.2d 425 (2005).
52. Id. at 22-23, 625 S.E.2d at 427.
53. Id. at 24-25, 625 S.E.2d at 428-29.
54. Id. at 24, 625 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting Peachtree N. Apts. Co. v. Huffman-Wolfe Co.,
126 Ga. App. 594, 595, 191 S.E.2d 485, 486 (1972) (citations and punctuation omitted)).
55. Id. at 23, 625 S.E.2d at 428.
56. Id. at 24, 625 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting Peachtree,126 Ga. App at 594, 191 S.E.2d at

485).
57. Id. at 25, 625 S.E.2d at 429.
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which the court found to be factually unsupported and conclusory, were
not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.58
D. Effect of Continuous Employment on Workers' Compensation
Damages Arising out of an Automobile Accident
In recent years, the trend for many construction companies has been
to temporarily relocate employees to geographic areas for particular
construction projects rather than opening an office in the location of
every project. The case of Ray Bell Construction Co. v. King59 is an
important case because the court of appeals held a contractor liable for
workers' compensation dependency benefits after one of its relocated
employees died as the result of a traffic accident on a Sunday afternoon
6°
while the employee was not directly engaged in company business.
Ray Bell Construction Co. ("Ray Bell") employed the decedent,
Howard, as a superintendent for a project in Butts County, Georgia. In
order for Howard to be located closer to the project, Ray Bell provided
company housing located in Fayetteville, Georgia. Ray Bell also
provided Howard with a company truck to use for business and for his
own personal use. Howard was severely injured one Sunday afternoon
on his way back from delivering some family furniture to a storage area
located on his family's property in Alamo. Howard died the next day.
The evidence showed that Howard was returning either to his company
housing or to the job site.6 '
The court of appeals affirmed the award of dependency benefits to
Howard's widow and child on the basis that Howard was continuously
employed by Ray Bell, and thus his death arose out of and in the course
of his employment.6 2 Ray Bell contended that Howard was on a
personal mission and therefore could not be deemed to be acting in the
course of his employment." In upholding the award of dependency
benefits, the court of appeals noted that
"[t]he proper test to be applied is whether an employee while working
away from his home is required by his employment to lodge and work
within an area geographically limited by the necessity of being

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 25-26, 625 S.E.2d at 429.
277 Ga. App. 144, 625 S.E.2d 541 (2006).
Id. at 145, 625 S.E.2d at 542.
Id.
Id. at 145-46, 625 S.E.2d at 542.
Id.
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available for work on the employer's job site and is, in effect, in
continuous employment."'
The rationale for this rule is that such an employee is "required by their
employment to lodge and work within a particular geographic area
different from where they would otherwise be, and are therefore exposed
to the 'perilsof the highway and the hazards of hotels' while traveling for
work."6" Ray Bell was not successful in arguing that Howard had
deviated from his employment by undertaking a personal mission
because all of the evidence showed that Howard was returning either to
the company apartment or to the job site.66
III.

MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

During the survey period, the court of appeals attempted to clarify the
law on what constitutes "improvement of real estate" within the meaning
of Georgia's Mechanics' and Materialmen's Lien statute, Official Code of
That
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") sections 44-14-361 to -367.67
decision was later nullified by the Georgia General Assembly.6" The
court of appeals also addressed the issue of whether O.C.G.A. section 4414-361(a) 69 requires potential lien claimants not in privity with the
general contractor to send statutory notices to both the owner and the
general contractor where the owner is also the general contractor.
A.

Improvement of Real Estate

In Trench Shoring Services of Atlanta, Inc. v. Westchester Fire
Insurance Co., 7o Trench Shoring Services of Atlanta ("Trench Shoring")
and Campbell Brown Construction, LLC ("CBC") entered into a written
agreement whereby Trench Shoring would supply CBC equipment to be
used to connect a sewer main in a public right-of-way to a new sewer
system being constructed in a private residential subdivision. Although
Trench Shoring's equipment was used to connect to the sewer in the
subdivision, the sewer construction took place completely within the
public right-of-way immediately adjacent to the subdivision, and no

64. Id. at 146, 625 S.E.2d at 542 (quoting Boyd Bros. Transp. Co. v. Fonville, 237 Ga.
App. 721, 722, 516 S.E.2d 573, 574 (1999)).
65. Id., 625 S.E.2d at 543 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga.
App. 594, 599, 44 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1947)).
66. Id. at 147, 625 S.E.2d at 543.
67. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-361 to -367 (2002 & Supp. 2006).
68. The General Assembly's action nullifying the court of appeals decision is discussed
infra part VI.E. of this Article.
69. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(a).
70. 274 Ga. App. 850, 619 S.E.2d 361 (2005).
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Trench Shoring equipment was provided directly on the private
residential property in question."1
After the sewer construction was completed, CBC failed to pay Trench
Shoring for the use of its equipment, and Trench Shoring filed a lien
against the private residential property pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 4414-361.1,2 despite the fact that its equipment was used solely on the
public right-of-way and not in the subdivision.7" The owner discharged
the lien by securing a bond from Westchester Fire Insurance Co. and
then filed for bankruptcy protection. Trench Shoring filed an action to
foreclose on the bond.74 The trial court later granted Westchester's
motion for summary judgment on the basis that "'the lien does not
identify the right-of-way property for which Plaintiff supplied materials."'75 Trench Shoring appealed.76
The court of appeals observed that under Georgia's Mechanics' and
Materialmen's Lien Statute, as it existed at the time the case was
decided,77 suppliers who furnished equipment for the improvement of
real estate had a "'special lien on the real estate . . . or other property
for which they furnish[ed] labor, services, or materials.'7, 8
The
question before the court was whether "persons who furnish materials
under contract with a private owner" have a materialmen's lien under
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361 against the owner's private property for work
performed off-site on an adjoining public right-of-way. 9
Trench
Shoring urged the court to adopt a broad reading of the statute, such
that work performed off-site on public land would qualify the adjacent
but privately-held land for a special lien. ° Trench Shoring argued that
even though its equipment was used for sewer construction on public
land, it improved the adjacent residential property as specified in
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.8'
The court recognized that in Georgia, materialmen's liens are in
derogation of the common law and thus are strictly construed by Georgia

71. Id. at 850, 619 S.E.2d at 362.
72. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1.
73. Trench Shoring, 274 Ga. App. at 850, 619 S.E.2d at 362.
74. Id.

75.

Id. at 851, 619 S.E.2d at 362.

76.

Id.

77. For a discussion of the new amendment to Georgia's Mechanics' and Materialmen's
Lien statute, see infra part VI of this Article.
78. Trench Shoring, 274 Ga. App. at 851, 619 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-14361(a)).
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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courts in favor of property owners and against materialmen.82 The
court stated that in order to constitute "improvements" to real estate,
materials such as "'nails, glass, hardware, etc."' must go into and
become a part of the finished structure or building.83 Because Trench
Shoring's equipment was utilized exclusively off-site in the sewer
construction and not on the private development property itself, the
court, in accordance with well-established case law, determined that
under Georgia's mechanic's lien statute, such off-site work may not be
classified as an "'improvement to the property.'" 4 The court declined
to broaden the meaning of the statute absent an act by the legislature
to include off-site work. 5
After the court's decision in Trench Shoring, the General Assembly
amended the statute to broaden its application. 6 The amended version
provides that a special lien may now attach to an owner's adjoining real
property if the work done or materials furnished in an easement or
public right-of-way adjoining the property are the subject of the owner's
contract for the improvements and the work or materials are for the
8 7
benefit of that adjoining private property.
B.

Statutory Notice Requirements

In Roofing Supply of Atlanta, Inc. v. Forrest Homes, Inc.,88 Forrest
Homes, Inc. (the "owner") filed notices of commencement for certain
subdivision projects, listing itself as the owner and general contractor,
and entered into a contract with a roofing subcontractor. The roofing
subcontractor then bought materials from Roofing Supply of Atlanta, Inc.
("RSA") for the projects. RSA did not give the "Notice to Contractor"
required under O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361(a) to Forrest Homes. 9 After
the roofing subcontractor failed to pay RSA for its materials, RSA filed
claims of lien against the owner's property. When RSA refused to
remove the liens, the owner sued RSA to quiet title and asserted claims
against RSA for tortious interference with business relations and slander
of title. The owner also sought attorney fees and punitive damages.9

82.
83.
S.E.2d
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id., 619 S.E.2d at 362-63.
Id., 619 S.E.2d at 363 (quoting Amador v. Thomas, 259 Ga. App. 835, 838, 578
537, 540 (2003)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361).
Id. at 852, 619 S.E.2d at 363.
Ga. S.B. 530, § 1, Reg. Sess. (2006) (amending O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(b)).
Id.
279 Ga. App. 504, 632 S.E.2d 161 (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(a).
Roofing Supply, 279 Ga. App. at 504-05, 632 S.E.2d at 162-63.
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Because RSA had not sent a Notice to Contractor to the owner or to
the contractor, the trial court found that RSA's claims of lien were
invalid and that it had forfeited its rights to materialmen's liens. The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the owner, quieting
title, removing the liens, and dismissing all remaining claims. Both
parties appealed.9'
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.9 2 Under
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.5(b),9" an owner, or the owner's agent or
contractor, must file with the clerk of the superior court in the county
where the project is located a "Notice of Commencement" no later than
fifteen days after the contractor starts work on the property. 9 4 The
notice must contain information relevant to the lien rights of potential
lien claimants on the project and other information listed in O.C.G.A.
section 44-14-361.5(b), including but not limited to the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of the contractor, the owner, and the lender, as
well as the legal description of the property.9 5 To be effective, a copy
of the Notice of Commencement must be posted at the job site throughout the duration of the project and given to any subcontractor, materialman, or person making a written request to the contractor for a copy.96
The purpose of the Notice of Commencement is to identify potential
97
lien claimants who do not have a direct contract with the contractor.
A subtle side-effect of the notice is that it cuts off the lien rights of any
remote supplier or materialman not in "privity of contract with the
contractor" who fails to properly respond to a recorded and posted Notice
of Commencement by sending both the owner and the contractor a
Notice to Contractor "within 30 days from the filing of the Notice of
Commencement or 30 days following the first delivery of labor, services,
or materials to the property, whichever is later .

..

."" For purposes

of the Notice of Commencement, a "contractor" is "acontractor having
privity of contract with the owner of the real estate."99
In the main appeal, RSA contended that its liens were not invalidated
by its failure to provide Forrest Homes with a Notice to Contractor. RSA
argued that under the mechanic's lien statute, the contractor and owner
cannot be the same entity because an entity cannot be in privity with

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(a).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-360(1).
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itself, and therefore Forrest Homes's Notice of Commencement was
defective. RSA also contended that the "true" contractor was not Forrest
Homes, but the roofing subcontractor with whom it had a contract;
therefore, the statute did not require RSA to send a Notice to Contractor
to Forrest Homes.'00 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that
RSA's contentions were without merit. 10 1
The court of appeals noted that "'the legislature has mandated strict
compliance with"' the mechanic's lien statute and that "'[the Georgia
Supreme] Court has followed the rule that lien statutes in derogation of
the common law must be strictly construed in favor of the property
owner and against the materialman."" 2 As a result, failure to comply
with the lien statute's provisions may result in a lien claim being
unenforceable. 0 3 The court stated that the language of the notice
provision was designed to do two things: (1) protect owners and general
contractors from unfair surprise "by unknown debts of subcontractors"
and (2) ensure that remote subcontractors and materialmen are paid for
their work and materials supplied to a project. 10 4 Here, the court
concluded that Forrest Homes had complied with the statute's requirements by filing and posting a Notice of Commencement. 10 5 Likewise,
RSA could have complied with the statute by giving notice to Forrest
Homes that it was supplying roofing materials.0 6 Because RSA failed
to give the requisite notice, its liens were invalid and unenforceable.' 7
The court dismissed all of the owner's remaining claims, 08 including
but not limited to, its claim for tortious interference with business
relations, which was premised upon RSA's refusal to remove its liens
after receiving written notice to do so. 09 The court reiterated that in
Georgia, there is no tort for filing a wrongful claim of lien."0 If a
mechanics' or materialmen's lien is not properly filed, the cause of action
is not a tort claim but rather a claim for defamation concerning land

100. Roofing Supply, 279 Ga. App. at 505, 632 S.E.2d at 163.
101. Id. at 506, 632 S.E.2d at 163.
102. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Few v. Capitol Materials, 274 Ga. 784, 785, 559
S.E.2d 429, 430 (2002)).
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 507, 632 S.E.2d at 164.
108. Id. at 507-08, 632 S.E.2d at 164-65.
109. Id., 632 S.E.2d at 164.
110. Id. at 507, 632 S.E.2d at 164.
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under O.C.G.A. section 51-9-11.1
To prove defamation of title, the
plaintiff must show that the statements in the lien were false and the
claimant was aware of their falsity.1 12 The court concluded that even
though RSA's claims of lien were improperly filed, the owner did not
meet its burden to show that the statements in the lien notices were
false."' In dicta, the court also noted that under O.C.G.A. section 515-81"4 and prior Georgia case law, RSA's filing of the lien notice would
have been privileged." 5
IV. ARBITRATION
During the survey period, the court of appeals rendered several
decisions regarding arbitration of construction disputes, including an
issue of first impression relating to the arbitrability of the res judicata
effect of a prior arbitration. The decisions underscore the court's
continued reluctance to vacate or modify an arbitration award for
manifest disregard of the law in the absence of an arbitration hearing
transcript or detailed findings of fact in the arbitration award.
A.

Arbitrability of Res Judicata Effect of PriorArbitration

The Georgia Court of Appeals was presented with an issue of first
impression in Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan County."' This
was the parties' third appearance before the court and Yates's third
demand for arbitration with Bryan County. The original dispute arose
out of Yates Paving & Grading Co., Inc.'s ("Yates") written contract with
Bryan County (the "County") to build and improve public roads in a
subdivision. Before the project was completed, the County ordered Yates
to cease working and hired a different contractor to finish the project.
Yates filed a demand for arbitration and won an award that was later
confirmed by the trial court and on appeal."'
Yates then filed a motion seeking a second arbitration relating solely
to the issue of appellate attorney fees and costs that it had incurred in

111. Id. (citing Amador, 259 Ga. App. at 837, 578 S.E.2d at 540); O.C.G.A. § 51-9-11
(2000).
112. Roofing Supply, 279 Ga. App. at 507, 632 S.E.2d at 164.
113. Id.
114. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8 (2000).
115. Roofing Supply, 279 Ga. App. at 508, 632 S.E.2d at 164-65 (citing Premier
Cabinets v. Bulat, 261 Ga. App. 578, 584, 583 S.E.2d 235, 240 (2003)).
116. 275 Ga. App. 347, 620 S.E.2d 606 (2005). If the case sounds familiar, an earlier
iteration appeared in the Mercer Law Review construction law survey in 2004. See Dennis
J. Webb, Jr., Henry L. Balkcom IV & Dana R. Grantham, ConstructionLaw, 56 MERCER
L. REV. 109, 140-41 (2004).
117. Yates, 275 Ga. App. at 347, 620 S.E.2d at 607.
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defense of the original arbitration award. The trial court denied Yates's
motion, finding that despite a provision in the parties' arbitration
agreement for the award of attorney fees and costs, that provision did
not encompass appellate attorney fees. 118 On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed again, holding that the parties' valid and enforceable
arbitration clause was unambiguous and clearly provided that "all
claims, disputes, and 'other matters' relating to the contract will be
decided by arbitration," including the issue of appellate attorney
fees."'9 In that round, the court pointed out that the contract's
arbitration clause made no distinction about the type of attorney
fees. 2 ° In addition, Yates's counterclaim against the County sought
to enforce Yates's claims under the Georgia Prompt Pay Act, 21 which
expressly provides for the recovery of attorney fees on
appeal, regardless
22
of whether such claims are litigated or arbitrated.
Yates then filed a third demand for arbitration for damages arising
out of the County's "'wrongful call of the bond instruments,'" which
Yates alleged resulted in the surety refusing to issue Yates any further
bonds-effectively precluding Yates from bidding on any government
contracts requiring bonds. 123 The County's insurer filed a declaratory
action seeking a stay of arbitration. The County asked for a permanent
injunction against Yates's third arbitration, contending that the doctrine
of res judicata barred Yates's request for arbitration on the issue of
damages caused by the bond recall. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the County on the res judicata claim
and entered an
1 24
injunction precluding arbitration of the bond issue.
Yates appealed, asserting that under the terms of its contract with the
County, the issue of res judicata was for the arbitrators to decide, not
the court. 125 Under the facts of this case, in an issue of first impression, the court of appeals agreed. 126 In doing so, the court was persuaded by several prior decisions by the Third, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeal, which concluded that the preclusive effect of

118. Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan County, 265 Ga. App. 578, 580, 594 S.E.2d
756, 758-59 (2004).
119. Id. at 581-82, 594 S.E.2d at 759.
120. Id. at 582, 594 S.E.2d at 759.
121. O.C.G.A. §§ 13-11-1 to -11 (Supp. 2006)
122. Yates, 265 Ga. App. at 582, 594 S.E.2d at 760.
123. Yates, 275 Ga. App. at 347, 620 S.E.2d at 607.
124. Id. at 348, 620 S.E.2d at 608.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 350, 620 S.E.2d at 608-09.
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a first arbitrator's decision is an issue for a later arbitrator
to consider,
127
rather than an issue for the court's determination.
In the instant case, as the court previously noted, the parties'
agreement contained the following binding and unambiguous arbitration
clause: "'All claims, disputes and other matters in question between [the
parties] arising out of, or relating to the Contract Documents... will be
decided by arbitration."'12 8 The court held that where, as here, the
arbitration clause is valid and enforceable, the res judicata effect of the
final award issued in the first arbitration should be decided129by the
arbitrators, not the court, because it arises out of the contract.
B.

Manifest Disregardof the Law

In Ordner Construction Co. v. Parkside Crossing, 300, LLC,13 0 the
court of appeals declined to vacate an arbitration award entered in a
building contract dispute between the contractor, Ordner Construction
Company, Inc. ("Ordner"), and the property owner, Parkside Crossing,
300, LLC ("Parkside"), in the absence of a transcript of the arbitration
hearing or detailed findings of fact by the arbitrator. 131
Ordner entered into a standard American Institute of Architects
agreement with Parkside for the construction of an office building. After
a dispute arose between the parties, Ordner filed a demand for
arbitration seeking the unpaid balance of its contract. Parkside
counterclaimed for damages for negligent construction,
use of poor
13 2
quality materials, attorney fees, costs, and interest.
At the hearing, the arbitrator awarded Ordner $70,000 for its contract
balance, and Parkside was awarded $165,000 for lost rents, cost to
complete the project, repairs, attorney fees, and other expenses, which
resulted in a net award to Parkside of $95,000.1 3 The parties did not
have the underlying arbitration hearing reported.'
When Parkside filed its petition in superior court to confirm the
award, Ordner moved to vacate or modify the award. 1 5 After a

127. Id. at 349-50, 620 S.E.2d at 608-09 (citing Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys.,
207 F.3d 1126, 1132-34 (9th Cir. 2000); Indep. Lift Truck Builders Union v. NACCO
Materials Handling Group, 202 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2000); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 139-40 (3d Cir. 1998)).
128. Id. at 350, 620 S.E.2d at 609 (omission and last alteration in original).
129. Id.
130. 276 Ga. App. 753, 624 S.E.2d 206 (2005).
131. Id. at 755, 624 S.E.2d at 208.
132. Id. at 753, 624 S.E.2d at 207.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 754, 624 S.E.2d at 208.
135. Id., 624 S.E.2d at 207.
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hearing, the court modified the award, striking Parkside's damages for
lost rental income on the basis that the "'arbitrator overstepped his
consequential damages expressly not allowed by
authority by ' awarding
136
the contract.
Ordner appealed the court's decision on two grounds: (1) the superior
court should have vacated the entire arbitration award pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-9-13(b)(5) 137 because the arbitrator exhibited
manifest disregard of the law by awarding significantly less than the
parties' stipulated contract balance and (2) under O.G.C.A. section 13-611,138 Parkside was not entitled to an award of attorney fees because
when the court struck lost
it lost its status as the nonprevailing party
139
rental income from the arbitration award.
Without a hearing transcript or an arbitrator's detailed findings of
fact, the court of appeals stated that it had "no means of discerning the
basis for the arbitrator's decision;" therefore, the court could not
determine whether the lower court erred when it refused to vacate the
arbitration award. 4 ' The court reiterated that under Georgia law,
"'[T]he absence of a ... transcript precludes review of... claims of error
of the
committed by the arbitrator, thereby necessitating an affirmance
'
[superior court's] refusal to vacate the arbitration award. '
In McGill Homes, Inc. v. Weaver, 4' the appellant's failure to fulfill
its burden of showing by the record that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law again resulted in the court of appeals affirming the trial
court's denial of the appellant's motion to vacate the award. 141 McGill
Homes (the "builder") and Weaver (the "purchaser") entered into a
purchase and temporary occupancy agreement by which the purchaser
would occupy the house pending closing. The parties' agreement
specified that all claims arising out of or related to the purchase
agreement would be resolved by binding arbitration.'1
After a dispute arose between the parties, the purchaser filed for
arbitration, and a hearing was held. The arbitrator found the builder
liable for defective and incomplete construction and also required the

136. Id.
137. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5) (Supp. 2006).
138. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 2006).
139. Ordner, 276 Ga. App. at 754-55, 624 S.E.2d at 207-08.
140. Id. at 755, 624 S.E.2d at 208.
141. Id. at 754, 624 S.E.2d at 208 (omission and brackets in original) (quoting Brown
v. Premiere Designs, 266 Ga. App. 432, 434, 597 S.E.2d 466, 468 (2004)); see also Humar
Props. v. Prior Tire Enters., 270 Ga. App. 306, 308, 605 S.E.2d 926, 927-28 (2004).
142. 278 Ga. App. 622, 629 S.E.2d 535 (2006).
143. Id. at 624, 629 S.E.2d at 537.
144. Id. at 623, 629 S.E.2d at 536.
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builder to satisfy a mechanic's lien that had been filed against the
property.14 The builder then filed a motion to vacate the award on
the basis of the arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law, contending
that damages awarded by the arbitrator were, among other deficiencies,
"not in proportion to the actual costs of completing the walk through list
....

2,146

The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's order, which

denied the builder's motion to vacate the arbitration award. 147 The
court again based its decision on the failure of the builder to provide a
transcript of the arbitration proceedings and thereby fulfill its burden of
showing by the record that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the
law. ~
V.

MISCELLANEOUS

This section contains cases which do not fall neatly into one of the
other previously discussed topics or categories.
A. The FairBusiness PracticesAct
In a 2005 decision case, Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp.
("Tiismann I/"),49 the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals in an action brought by Tiismann, the homeowner, against
Linda Martin Homes Corporation (the "builder") ("Tiismann I) 5" for,
inter alia, violations of the Fair Business Practices Act (the "FBPA"). 151
The supreme court determined that the statute of limitations did not bar
Tiismann's cause of action and remanded the
case for consideration of
15 2
the alternative reasonable reliance ground.
Tiismann's underlying claims arose from a dispute between the parties
with regard to alleged defects and building code violations in the
construction of Tiismann's home. After an arbitration hearing, the
arbitrator granted Tiismann an award on his claims relating to the code
violations. Tiismann then pursued an FBPA action against the builder,
alleging that the builder's construction contract was duplicitous because
it contained contradictory language guaranteeing that the builder would
construct the home in accordance with the building codes while
simultaneously incorporating a limited warranty disclaiming responsibil-

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 624, 629 S.E.2d at 537.
Id. at 623-24, 629 S.E.2d at 537.
279 Ga. 137, 610 S.E.2d 68 (2005).
Tiismann I, 268 Ga. App. 787, 603 S.E.2d 45 (2004).
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-390 to -407 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
Tiismann 1I, 279 Ga. at 140, 610 S.E.2d at 69, 70.
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ity for any violations of the code.," 3 The trial court granted the
builder's motion for summary judgment on the basis that (1) Tiismann's
FBPA claim was barred by the running of the statute of limitations and
(2) as a matter of law, Tiismann could not show that he reasonably
relied on the conflicting contract terms.1"4 The court of appeals
affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the statute of limitations
ground, and Tiismann appealed.'55 The Supreme15 6 Court reversed the
court of appeals decision and remanded the case.
On remand, in Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp. ("Tiismann
III"), '5 Tiismann asserted that the builder had a legal duty, independent of the contract, to comply with all building codes, and that the
builder violated the FBPA by refusing responsibility for its code
violations, not for any misrepresentations the builder may have made in
the purchase agreement.'
After vacating its prior opinion, the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the
basis that Tiismann could not have reasonably relied on the conflicting
contract terms. 159 The court stated that under Georgia's FBPA statute,
Unless it can be said that the defendant's actions had or has [sic]
potential harm for the consumer public[,] the act or practice cannot be
said to have "impact" on the consumer marketplace and any "act or
practice which is outside that context, no matter how unfair or
deceptive, is not directly regulated by the FBPA."' 60
Moreover, under Zeeman v. Black,'6' the court stated that reasonable
reliance is in fact an essential element of an FBPA claim, contrary to
6 2
Tiismann's assertion."
If, as Tiismann contended, he knew that the
builder's "express warranty disclaiming responsibility for building to
code was legally invalid at the time he signed it," then Tiismann's actual
knowledge of the purported falsity showed that his reliance was
unjustifiable.'
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to the builder on the ground that

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
S.E.2d
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 137, 610 S.E.2d at 69.
Id.
Tiismann I, 268 Ga. App. 787, 603 S.E.2d 45.
Tiismann 11, 279 Ga. at 137-38, 610 S.E.2d at 69.
276 Ga. App. 846, 625 S.E.2d 32 (2006).
Id. at 848, 625 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 847, 851, 625 S.E.2d at 34, 37.
Id. at 848, 625 S.E.2d at 35 (quoting Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 84, 273
910, 915 (1980)).
156 Ga. App. 82, 273 S.E.2d 910 (1980).
Tiisman III, 276 Ga. App. at 849, 625 S.E.2d at 36.
Id. at 851, 625 S.E.2d at 37.
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Tiismann entered the contract with full knowledge of its contents, and
thus could not have reasonably relied on the contract's contradictory
language when he signed the agreement. 6 ' The Georgia Supreme
Court granted Tiismann's petition for a writ of certiorari, and affirmed
the court of appeals' opinion in its entirety on October 25, 2006.165 The
supreme court confirmed that Zeeman v. Black remains viable authority
as to the
proper interpretation and construction of Georgia's FBPA
1 66
statute.
B. General Liability Insurance Coverage for Defective Construction
Work
In McDonald Construction Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.,167 the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary
judgment to a commercial general liability ("CGL") insurance carrier and
denied the general contractor's claim for reimbursement for the various
costs it incurred to repair and replace defective flooring installed on a
construction project. 8 The court clarified the rule governing design
and construction defect cases: repair and replacement of the insured's
defective work does not qualify as "property damage."16 9
A general contractor, McDonald Construction Company, Inc. ("McDonald"), entered into a contract with the Augusta Housing Authority to
upgrade and remodel an Augusta public housing complex containing
twenty-six buildings. McDonald then subcontracted with a flooring
subcontractor for the installation of vinyl composition tile ("VCT")
flooring. 7 ' After the project experienced significant problems with
delamination of the VCT flooring during and after construction, the
project architect issued an order of condemnation with regard to the
unsuitable tile and "instructed McDonald to correct the problem." 7 '
In order to fulfill its obligations under its contract with the housing
authority, McDonald then hired a second flooring subcontractor to
replace the VCT flooring and submitted a claim under its CGL policy
seeking recovery of the costs it had incurred in replacing the tile, as well
as costs for testing, lost overhead and profit, attorney fees, gas and

164. Id.
165. Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., No. S06G0848, 2006 WL 3019550, at *5
(Ga. Oct. 25, 2006).
166. Id. at *2.
167. 279 Ga. App. 757, 632 S.E.2d 420 (2006).
168. Id. at 757, 632 S.E.2d at 420.
169. Id. at 762, 632 S.E.2d at 423.
170. Id. at 757, 632 S.E.2d at 421.
171. Id. at 758, 632 S.E.2d at 421.
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travel costs, and lodging. McDonald did not submit any claim based on
tort liability from the loose tiles, such as injury to a third party or
damage to property. When the CGL carrier denied its claims, McDonald
filed suit for breach of contract.'72
The trial court granted the CGL carrier partial summary judgment on
McDonald's claim for the cost of the tile replacement effort, finding that
the costs of replacement were part and parcel of McDonald's contractual
obligation to conform with the project requirements and that the
additional work did not arise from any tort liability. The trial court
denied summary judgment, however, for other costs incurred by the
general contractor as a result of the defective work, such as the cost to
remove the furniture so the new tile subcontractor could gain access to
the areas to replace the tile. 173 The trial court concluded that those
costs "might be considered 'damage to other property' under the
contract," and thus potentially covered under the terms of the1 5CGL
74
insurance policy.1 Both parties appealed from the court's order.
Because the facts were largely uncontested, the court of appeals
confined its analysis to whether McDonald's CGL policy covered
McDonald's claim. 1 76 The court reiterated that "'[TIhe purpose of...
comprehensive liability insurance coverage is to provide protection for
personal injury or for property damage caused by the completed product,
but not for replacement and repair of that product.'"177 Moreover, CGL
coverage is not intended to cover the contractual liabilities of the insured
for costs incurred to meet its contractual obligations. 17
Rather,
general liability insurance coverage is designed to protect the insured
party from the "'potentially limitless liability'" associated with the risk
that the completed construction work will cause bodily injury or property
damage for which the insured may be liable. 7 The court concluded
that "[for there to be coverage under a CGL policy for faulty workmanship, there would have to be damage to property other than the work

172. Id. at 758-59, 632 S.E.2d at 421-22.
173. Id. at 759, 632 S.E.2d at 422
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 760, 632 S.E.2d at 422.
177. Id. at 761, 632 S.E.2d at 423 (omission in original and emphasis added) (quoting
Elrod's Custom Drapery Workshop v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 670, 670, 371
S.E.2d 144, 145 (1988)).
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting SawHorse, Inc. v. S. Guar. Ins. Co. of Ga., 269 Ga. App. 493,495, 604
S.E.2d 541, 544 (2004)).
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itself and the insured's liability for such180 damage would have to arise
from negligence, not breach of contract."

In the case at bar, the general contractor repeatedly acknowledged
that it repaired the defective flooring pursuant to its obligations under
the construction contract. No evidence was presented indicating that
any bodily injuries or injuries to other property had resulted from the
defective flooring or that any property had been damaged in the process
of removing the furniture to gain access to the defective tile.18 '
Instead, the evidence showed that all costs incurred by the general
contractor "arose under its construction contract with the Housing
Authority, not from any tort liability that arose outside of the construction contract."'82 Concluding that there was no evidence in the record
that any damage occurred to the Augusta Housing Authority property
or that any personal injuries resulted from the delamination or
replacement of the tile, the court of appeals held that as a matter of law,
none of the costs incurred by McDonald were covered under its CGL
policy. 3
C. Public Contract Bid Protest
In the case of R. D. Brown Contractors,Inc. v. Board of Education of
Columbia County, 84 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the losing
bidder on a public school project could not enjoin the school board's
contract with the winning bidder simply because the winning bidder did
not provide a list of subcontractors as required by the bid documents.'
R. D. Brown Contractors, Inc. ("Brown") brought a claim
seeking injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order after it was
denied a contract with the Columbia County Board of Education ("school
board").'
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of
Brown's petition for an interlocutory injunction. 7
Brown's bid was $11,318,000 compared to the winning bid of
$11,259,000 submitted by another contractor, Brown and McKnight
Construction Co. ("McKnight")."
The bid documents provided, among
other things, (1) that bids would be opened and read aloud at 2:00 p.m.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 761-62, 632 S.E.2d at 423.
Id.
Id., 632 S.E.2d at 424.
Id. at 762, 764, 632 S.E.2d at 424-25.
280 Ga. 210, 626 S.E.2d 471 (2006).
Id. at 213-14, 626 S.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 211, 626 S.E.2d at 473.
Id. at 210, 626 S.E.2d at 473.
Id. at 211, 626 S.E.2d at 473.
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on a given date; (2) that the bids should contain a list of all major
subcontractors with which the bidder would propose to build the project;
(3) that no changes in the subcontractor list could be made post-bid
without the approval of the school board; and (4) that the school board
reserved "the right to reject any or all bids and to waive technicalities
and informalities and to award the project on whatever basis is in the
interest of [the school board]." 8 9 The bid submitted by McKnight at
2:00 p.m. did not contain a list of the major subcontractors that it
proposed to use, but McKnight later supplied its list to the school board
at 3:45 p.m. that same day.190
At the hearing on Brown's temporary restraining order, the trial court
concluded that Brown was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its
claims.19' On appeal, the supreme court agreed, basing its decision on
the public bidding statutes, which give a public body discretion to waive
technicalities and informalities and to accept a bid that "conforms to the
invitation for bids 'in all material respects.' 192 Specifically, O.C.G.A.
section 36-91-21(b)(4)193 provides that "'a contract shall be awarded to
the lowest responsible and responsive bidder whose bid meets the
requirements and criteria set forth in the invitation for bids.' ''194 In

addition, O.C.G.A. section 36-91-2(12)19 5 defines the "'responsive bidder"' as the bidder that "'has submitted a bid or proposal that conforms
in all material respects to the requirements set forth in the invitation for
bids or request for proposals.""'
Finally, O.C.G.A. section 36-9120(c) 197 provides that a public body "'shall have the authority to reject
any and all bids or proposals and to waive technicalities and informalities.'"1 98

The supreme court concluded that the statutes clearly contemplate
that "some provisions of a bid may be considered immaterial and
constitute the sort of 'technicalities and informalities' that the governmental entity can waive."'99 Indeed, the subcontractor list was an
item that could be changed post-bid with the school board's consent. °°

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 210-11, 626 S.E.2d at 473.
Id. at 211, 626 S.E.2d at 473.
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Id. at 213, 626 S.E.2d at 474-75 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-91-2(12) (2006)).
O.C.G.A. § 36-91-21(b)(4) (2006).
Brown, 280 Ga. at 212, 626 S.E.2d at 474 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-91-21(b)(4)).
O.C.G.A. § 36-91-2(12).
Brown, 280 Ga. at 212, 626 S.E.2d at 474 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-91-2(12)).
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Therefore, the court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that
the subcontractor list was an immaterial item that could be waived and
that was, in fact, waived by the school board."'
VI.

LEGISLATION

During the survey period, the Georgia General Assembly amended a
number of construction-related statutes, including substantial revisions
to the Georgia "Right to Repair" Act,2 °2 Georgia's mandatory alternative dispute resolution framework for residential construction defect
claims. The newly enacted 2006 amendments to the "Right to Repair"
Act became effective on April 28, 2006, and will apply to all residential
construction defect claims arising on or after that date. 2 3
A.

Private Inspectors

The Georgia General Assembly amended Title 8, Buildings, of the
Georgia Code-changing provisions related to state building, plumbing,
and electrical codes-to provide for employment of private professional
providers to perform building plan reviews and inspections when the
state or local fire marshal, state inspector, or designated code official
cannot timely perform such services. 0 4
B.

Condominium Sales, Construction and Development
The Georgia legislature also changed certain provisions relating to
condominium sales and repairs.0 5 As amended, the Georgia Code now
provides that a seller of condominiums may use escrow funds in excess
of one percent of the purchase price from the sale of20°units for construction and development of the condominium property.
C.

Residential Construction Defects Claims
As mentioned above, the General Assembly also amended
mandatory dispute resolution framework instituted in 2004
resolution of residential construction defect claims occurring
Georgia. 2 7 Because the General Assembly struck the entire Part

the
for
in
2A

201. Id. at 214, 626 S.E.2d at 475.
202. O.C.G.A. §§ 8-2-35 to -43 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
203. Id. § 8-2-35.
204. Ga. H.B. 1385, §§ 1 to -4, Reg. Sess. (2006) (amending O.C.G.A. § 8-2-26 (2004)
and O.C.G.A. § 25-2-14 (2003)) (effective January 1, 2007).
205. Ga. S.B. 573, Reg. Sess. (2006) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 8-2-35 to -43 and O.C.G.A.
§ 44-3-112 (1991)).
206. Id. § 2 (amending O.C.G.A. § 44-3-112 (1991)).
207. O.C.G.A. §§ 8-2-35 to -43.
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and replaced it with an amended version, there does not appear to be a
redline version readily available to show specifically what language has
been changed from the prior statute. °8
Residential construction
practitioners, therefore, are left with the task of carefully reviewing the
new Part 2A for all significant changes from the prior version.
Unfortunately, the basic statutory scheme appears to have been left
relatively untouched, which means that homeowners, contractors, and
construction lawyers will continue to have to try and navigate between
Scylla and Charybdis in an effort to comply with the statute's labyrinthian requirements with regard to notice, offers, responses, and
rejections.
Overall, the Georgia Right to Repair Act's language was amended to
broaden the statute's reach by adding "or common area" after the word
"dwelling" in multiple sections, including O.C.G.A. sections 8-2-36(1), (5),
(6), and (6)(B), and sections 8-2-38(b)(2), (e), and (n).2" 9 Many of the
definition provisions were either modified or added.210
O.C.G.A. section 8-2-38(c) was amended to add the following language
at the end:
A contractor that does not respond to a notice of claim within the time
prescribed by subsection (b) of this Code section may not claim or
assert that the absence of documents required to be provided with the
notice of claim under subsection (a) of this Code section relieved the
contractor from the contractor's obligation to respond to the notice of
claim.211
New language has also been added to O.C.G.A. subsections 8-2-38(e) and
(h).2 1 2 O.C.G.A. section 8-2-38(m) was amended to clarify the period
within which a claimant must accept an offer of the contractor to remedy
a construction defect, providing that the offer must be accepted within
30 days after receipt214of the offer,213 rather than "within a reasonable
period after receipt."
O.C.G.A. section 8-2-39 has a new subsection (b), which provides that
if a construction defect "is discovered during the pendency of an action
filed in compliance with215[the statute]" it may be added as a supplemental or additional claim.
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Id.
See O.C.G.A. § 8-2-38(m) (2004).
Ga. S.B. 573, § 1.
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O.C.G.A. section 8-2-41 was reenacted without change and continues
to require the contractor to provide conspicuous statutory notice to the
homeowner of the statutory right to resolve defects.2 16 Interestingly,
however, the statute does not require that the notice be in the parties'
contract.217
Finally, certain provisions in O.C.G.A. sections 8-2-42 and -43 were
changed relating to "the prohibition against bribery of property or
association managers" and "relating to causes of action being created
and the contractor's right to seek recovery from subcontractors or other
professionals."2 18
D.

ContractorLicensing

The effective date by which persons must qualify and apply for
licensing as a residential or general contractor without an examination
has been extended to January 1, 2007.219 Persons seeking to be
licensed as a residential or general contractor through reciprocal
agreements with other states can apply starting January 1, 2007.22 o
The date when the licensing requirements and sanctions become
effective was changed to January 1, 2008.221
E.

Lien Law

Effective July 1, 2006, the Georgia Mechanics' and Materialmen's Lien
law was amended to provide that a special lien may attach to the real
property of a private owner for the value of work done or materials
furnished in an easement or public right-of-way adjoining the property,
if the work is for the benefit of the private property and within the scope
of the owner's contract for such improvements. 222 This amendment
effectively nullifies the court's holding in Trench Shoring Services of
Atlanta, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co.,223 which was discussed
earlier.224
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O.C.G.A. § 8-2-41(b) (2004 & Supp. 2006).
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See supra Part III.A.

